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The Humean conception of the self prevalent in the contemporary literature 
in moral and political philosophy, philosophy of mind, and action theory has 
yielded a persuasive model of human action that has contributed considerably 
to our understanding of moral motivation, rational action, and many other 
issues. But it has also generated certain problems. I should like to take issue 
with this conception, first by describing it in some detail and charting its 
connection with two such interrelated problems in moral psychology. Than I 
shall propose an alternative conception, cribbed in its essentials from Kant's 
metaphysics, that purports to do an even better job of explaining the psy- 
chological phenomena. Finally I shall argue that on the suggested alternative, 
these two problems do not arise. 
I. T H E  H U M E A N  C O N C E P T I O N  O F  T H E  S E L F  
The familiar Humean conception of the self is structured and motivated by 
desire. 1 By a desire, I shall mean, provisionally, something like what Brandt 
and Kim seem to mean by a want2: i.e., a disposition to feel pleasure or 
satisfaction in thinking about or admiring the object of  desire, and a disposi- 
tion to feel disappointment or frustration in its nonattainment. On this 
conception, the self is to be identified with its most central desires, plans and 
projects - i.e., with what Bernard Williams calls its character. 3 These desires 
structure the Humean self in two ways. First, through the distinction into 
first- and second-order desires, 4 they determine our evaluation of the other 
elements of personality: our emotions, beliefs, and so on. According to this 
view, first-order desires are desires for particular states of affairs conceived as 
external to the self: for nuclear disarmament, for example, or for a piece of  
carrot cake. Second-order desires are desires for certain first-order desires, 
hence for their attendant thoughts, feelings and dispositions. Second-order 
desires are desires that one be (or become) a certain kind of person: they 
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constitute a desired selfwonception. For example, suppose I have a central 
first-order desire for sex, drugs, and rock and roll. This desire may fulfill a 
second-order desire to be the kind of person who desires such things. Or it 
may frustrate a second-order desire to be  the kind of person who pines only 
after beauty, truth and goodness. The actual first-order desires which consti- 
tute the self either buttress or undermine our desired self-conception; our 
second-order desires tell us what that desired self-conception actually is. 
Thus there is an important distinction to be drawn between a self-concep- 
tion and a conception of the self. A self-conception picks out the basic inten- 
tional features in terms of which I actively identify myself. A conception of 
the self, on the other hand, provides a theoretical model that purports to 
explicate matters of fact regarding the nature and dynamics of  the self. That 
I view myself as tactless is part of my self-conception; that I am in fact to be 
identified with my moral convictions or social relations or desires is part of a 
conception of the self with which I may or may not be in agreement. Thus 
the two are independent. 
On this view, the Humean self is structured by its desires in a second way 
as well. For the importance of rationality as a defining feature of the self 
consists in its ability to provide hierarchical order and consistency to the 
totality of  desires one has on any particular occasion: to ensure their mutual 
consistency with one another, to rank them in order of importance, to 
schedule a plan for their satisfaction with respect to value, probability, spatial 
and temporal proximity, duration, and comprehensiveness, and finally to 
facilitate their satisfaction through maximally efficient action, s The structural 
components of  the self are desires, and the rational self is one in which these 
desires are ordered according to the canons of instrumental reason. Under- 
standing and reason are thus subordinate means for satisfying our desires. 6 
Desires, on this view, structure not only the self but the actions in which it 
finds expression. It is claimed that we begin with a certain set of  desires, and 
formulate beliefs about the most efficient means at our disposal for satisfying 
them. Other things equal, the actions we choose to perform then reflect those 
beliefs. Perceived or imagined objects of desire, then, provide the conative 
origin of  all actions] 
This conception of the self can be described as future-oriented in the sense 
that the self finds expression and continuity in setting for itself, in the 
present, some future, desired state of  affairs that it can anticipate working to 
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actualize over time.S This feature of  the Humean self can be regarded as the 
consequence of  tying a dispositional analysis o f  traits of  character to the 
foundational notion of  a desire. 9 To call a person generous or corrupt, on this 
analysis, is to describe a way she is disposed to act under certain circum- 
stances. But on the Humean conception of  the self, all action is motivated by 
desires the agent wishes to satisfy. Hence the concepts we invoke to describe 
a person's character or personality denote certain kinds of  desires that person 
is disposed to try to satisfy under the relevant circumstances. The self then 
achieves full realization to the extent that it succeeds in satisfying t h o s e  
desires. 
The Humean self is also heteronymous, to use Kant's term, x~ in that the 
conditions of  its expression are objects or states o f  affairs perceived as tempo- 
rally and/or spatially external to the self in its present incarnation. This 
external relation of  the self to its desired objects generates actions performed 
for the sake of  those objects. 1 ! And the full realization of  the self consists 
in bringing into existence those extrinsic desired states o f  affairs. 
Finally, the Humean conception of  the self is individualistic in that as a 
Humean self I am motivated to satisfy some desire only if the desire in 
question is mine. If  the desire belongs to someone else, than I am motivated 
to satisfy it only if I have a further desire I might thereby satisfy: i.e., to 
satisfy his desire. Of course this is not to say that all the desires I am moved 
to satisfy are inherently egoistic.12 i am moved to satisfy my desire to 
advance the common good, even at considerable personal disadvantage, by 
the prospect of  advancing the common good, not by that of  personal satisfac- 
tion. Nevertheless, advancing the common good must be the object of  my 
desire; otherwise 1 have no motivation for advancing it. Thus on this concep- 
tion o f  the self, that I merely believe some state of  affairs to best contribute 
to the common good, or to satisfy someone else's desire, is not  sufficient to 
motivate me to try to achieve it. In addition, I must have a desire to so 
contribute; to do so must be the object of my desire. 
These observations indicate the intimacy of  the relation between the self 
and agency. I f  I were nothing more than a passive contemplator, I could have 
no self whatsoever. For if I necessarily failed to distinguish, among the on- 
going panorama of  events, some which I caused to occur, I would equally lack 
the means o f  identifying those among my experiences which were caused by 
something else; I could identify no subject to whom these events were hap- 
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pening. But if I were unable to distinguish myself from the events that 
happened to me, it is difficult to imagine how I might then distinguish my 
self at all. 
However, that the self must find definition and expression through action 
does not imply that the self must be future-oriented, heteronymous, and 
individualistic. Hence it does not follow from the intrinsic connection between 
selfhood and agency that the Humean conception of the self is necessarily the 
correct one. 
II. S E L F - E V A L U A T I O N  A N D  M O R A L  P A R A L Y S I S  
Next consider two related issues subsumable most broadly under the rubric 
of moral psychology. The Humean conception of the self generates a difficul- 
ty about the possibility of self-evaluation, as both proponents and opponents 
of that conception have recognized. 13 Essentially, the difficulty lies in the 
notions that the self is structured by first- and second-order desires, and that 
second-order desires provide criteria for evaluation of the motivationally 
effective desires of the self. The question immediately arises of why we should 
accept as authoritative criteria these second-order desires. Why should we not 
subject them, in turn, to the critical scrutiny of third-order desires, and so on, 
ad infinitum? Frankfurt's answer is that "It is possible ... to terminate such a 
series of acts without cutting it off arbitrarily", by identifying oneself deci- 
sively with one of one's first-order desires. This means that questions regarding 
higher-order desires do not arise: 
The decisiveness of  the  c o m m i t m e n t  [one] has made means  tha t  [one] has decided that  
no fur ther  quest ion about  [one's] second-order volit ion, at any higher order, remains to 
be a sked )  4 
But on what ground has an agent made this decision? If there are no further 
grounds for halting the ascent to higher-order desires, then the decisive com- 
mitment one has made would seem to be arbitrary after all. That I lack the 
stamina or interest necessary for performing higher-order acts of self-evalua- 
tion does not confer authority on the n +/-order desires beyond which I 
refuse to look, any more than my refusal or inability to consider your point 
of view settles authoritatively the question of who has prevailed in our dis- 
agreement. If an authoritative termination of the infinite regress of orders of 
desire is to be contrasted with an arbitrary one, we shall need a better reason 
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for doing so than that we are too tired, or unwilling, to press further the hard 
task of self-evaluation. 
Hence if the Humean conception of the self is the correct one, we should 
experience some difficulties in performing that task. For any set of desires 
and interests to which I commit myself is likely to seem arbitrary upon reflec- 
tion. No action can then fully express my self because none can satisfy the 
desires of my self. And none can satisfy the desires of my self because there 
are no n-order desires with which I can fully identify. The consequence is a 
desired self-conception attenuated by doubts about the worth of that desire, 
and so about the action it is assumed to motivate. 
This calls into question the extent to which a Humean self might be 
motivated to action at all. If the infinite regress inhibits one's rational self- 
identification with any n-order set of desires, then there can be no actions to 
which one can commit oneself wholeheartedly and without reservation - not 
necessarily because one has conflicting impulses, but rather because the worth 
of any such impulse is automatically subject to doubt. That t am not in fact 
left with a continuing case of moral paralysis that vitiates my capacity for 
decisive and principled action suggests that the Humean conception does not 
render accurately the psychological facts. 
Some proponents of the Humean self seem to embrace a kind of moral 
paralysis as a sign of authenticity. Charles Taylor, for example, is seems to 
believe that it is both irresponsible and self-deceptive to presume that one's 
chosen action might successfully and conclusively quell the stirrings of 
conscience. Hence he accepts without reservation the implication that dogged 
and continuing reevaluation of the choices made by the self, and the prin- 
cipled doubt that any such reevaluation is itself adequate, must be permanent 
features of an authentic self. But I find troubling the notion that there are, 
and should be, in theory no terminating criteria for evaluating the worth of  
any desire one might have, nor of any action one might undertake. For then 
the whole point of ascending to the self-reflective stance of second-order 
desires in the first place seems to have been lost. 
Others may feel no qualms about simply digging in theirheels and coupling 
a forceful assertion of their intrinsic desires with a bald refusal to give any 
further justification of those desires. But this clearly fails to address the 
question of whether or not such terminating criteria have been met. We are 
ready to accept such a stance only when they have, in point of fact, been 
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met: The familiar intrinsic desires for friendship and intellectual stimulation 
resist further regress, whereas the anomalous or capricious desires to spend 
one's evening howling at the moon, or for continuing self-obliteration invite 
one. The diversity of our responses to such cases may, of course, be purely 
fortuitous. But it is more likely that the former set of desires is intelligible 
and the latter is not, and that both are susceptible to terminating criteria of 
rational intelligibility that the former satisfies and the latter violates. 
However, to explicate these criteria and their relation to the lower-order 
desires they evaluate requires us to move beyond the scope of the Humean 
conception of the self. For by definition, the concept of a higher-order desire 
is insufficient to supply such an explanation; and this is all the Humean con- 
ception of the self has to offer. Thus suppose that there are rational grounds 
on which decisive identification with one's n-order desires are made. This 
insures the authority of the decision to terminate the regress at some par- 
ticular point in the series, but only by sacrificing the evaluative authority of 
second-order desires. For whatever the ground on which we justify our 
decisive commitment to some set of n-order desires, those grounds cannot 
themselves be desires of any order. If they were, the regress could be reopened, 
merely by asking for reasons why we should be impressed with the authority 
of those n + 1-order desires. Here it will not do simply to point out that these 
are the desires we happen to have, or even that these are the final or intrinsic 
desires which confer urgency on all those that are instrumental to their satis- 
faction. For that we have desires doesn't demonstrate that they are non- 
arbitrary from the perspective of rational justification (suppose, for example, 
that my deepest intrinsic desire just is to spend my evenings howling at the 
moon). Afortiori ,  it doesn't demonstrate that they constitute authoritative 
and nonarbitrary terminating criteria of self-evaluation. Hence any such 
criteria to which we may appeal successfully must be independent, not only 
of the desires we actually do have, but even of those we should have. For part 
of the function of such criteria will be to furnish conclusive and compelling 
reasons for why we should have precisely those desires rather than some others. 
Gary Watson 16 has proposed a conception of the self that addresses this 
requirement. He suggests that we distinguish Reason and Appetite as two 
independent sources of motivation, as Plato did. On Watson's view, Reason is 
the source of evaluative judgments about "those principles and ends which 
[one] - in a cool and non-self-deceptive moment - articulates as definitive 
of the good, fulfilling, and defensible life". 17 These constitute rational values 
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which are motivationally effective and from the standpoint of which the 
worth of  our motivationally effective desires can be assessed. Since rational 
evaluations are of the first order too, the infinite regress does not arise. 
Or does it? Watson's picture of rational values suggests that the regress is 
to be blocked by demonstrating that the ends "definitive of the good, ful- 
filling, and defensible life" are authoritatively justified, i.e. that it would be 
absurd or irrelevant to raise any further doubts about the rational value of 
those criteria. This much seems to follow by definition of "defensible". But 
this characterization thereby begs the question. For we can agree that the 
rational defensibility of certain final ends renders them immune to the pres- 
sure to push the regress of justification one step further. But merely calling 
them defensible does not make them defensible. Without knowing what 
Watson intends by "good", and to whom and under what conditions a life is 
"defensible", there is no reason why my most favored activity of howling at 
the moon should not be definitive of  the "good, fulfilling, and defensible 
life" for me. And however ready you may be to accept my chosen way of  
life, surely you are justified in raising further doubts about its rationality. If 
Watson's rational values are truly rational, then we should be able to give 
persuasive reasons for holding them, and for according them precedence over 
the promptings of desire. That is, we should have some reason to believe that 
we are capable of evaluating ourselves correctly. Otherwise, Watson succeeds 
only in shifting the infinite regress from appetitive desires to "rational" values, 
rather than terminating it. 
Watson not only does not furnish such criteria. In fact, he cannot. For in 
painting a bipartite conception of a self that includes two independent 
sources of  motivation, he leaves open the psychological question of which 
source is in fact authoritative for any particular self, and begs the philosophi- 
cal question of which source should be. He is concerned to emphasize that 
the Reason-Appetite distinction does not commit us to any necessary or 
inevitable split between reason and desire, since, for example, we may value 
certain activities, such as eating or sex, precisely because of the desires they 
satisfy. 
But the distinction does commit us to the possibility of such a split. I f  there are sources 
of  motivation independent of  the agent's values, then it is possible that sometimes he is 
motivated to do things he does not deem worth doing. ~8 
However, even this understates the case. For if there are two, mutually 
independent sources of motivation within the self, then surely it must be an 
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open question with which source the agent identifies on any particular 
occasion, hence which constitutes her ~self-conception or (in Watson's termi- 
nology) "standpoint"J 9 Watson seems to take it for granted that an agent 
must be identified with the values that come from reason, and dissociate 
himself from any desires or actions that do not conform to them. But this 
assumption underestimates the role of action as expressive of the self. When i 
perform genuine action, there is a state of affairs which I envision as its 
outcome, intend to bring about, and work to bring about. The "I" in the 
preceding sentence is not neutral between reason and desire. Whichever 
source of motivation is causing the action is the one that, for that moment, 
expresses my self. If desire is motivating the action, and reason disapproves of 
it, then so much the worse, for the time being at least, for reason. And if the 
conflict persists over the long term, so much the worse for the unity of the 
self. 
Hence the problem of moral paralysis resurfaces in the form of a dilemma 
for the Platonic bipartite self: which part of the self ought to have motiva- 
tional priority on any particular occasion? And who - or what - ought to 
settle this question? If I act on my desires at the expense of reason, reason 
can reproach me with incontinence; or, at worst, Aristotelian self-indulgence. 
If my rational values take motivational precedence over my desires, the 
approval of conscience may be insignificant in the face of the frustration, 
regret, and alienation contingent upon ignoring the acknowledged demands 
of desire. 2~ If I am unlucky enough to be torn by equally strong but con- 
flicting tendencies from reason and desire, I may be as fully paralyzed as 
Buridan's Ass, and for much the same reason. If not, I will in any case be 
unable to exercise my agency in determining my behavior, and so will suffer 
the disquieting experience of being propelled into action by forces external 
to my will, regardless o f  the course o f  action on which I fi'nally embark. 21 
Under such conditions of perpetual internecine conflict, it is a wonder that 
we manage to do anything at all. 
And so for Watson's Platonic conception of the self, the psychological 
problem of moral paralysis is not resolved but exacerbated. This conception 
fails to resolve the problem because it contains an unexplicated assumption 
about which feature of the self has authoritative and motivational priority. 
Hence his proposed solution to the problem of self-evaluation suffers accord- 
ingly. If reason and desire must vie for control of the self as the original 
picture seems to suggest, then to appeal to rational values to terminate the 
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proliferation of orders of desire is no less arbitrary than it would be to 
appeal to any appetitive desire to do so. But in the absence of any further, 
highest court of appeals within which these conflicting demands can be 
adjudicated, a rationally and morally imperfect agent who nevertheless acts 
decisively and well much of the time must remain a theoretical enigma. 
Thus if we cannot provide, even in theory, some such terminating criteria for 
self-evaluation, it is unclear why we should bother to evaluate ourselves in the 
first place. Without an authoritative justification of the values and norms on 
which we both act and rely for criteria of self-evaluation, there is no non- 
arbitrary reason why we should commit ourselves to those values rather than 
to some others. Then it is not easy to explain how or why our actions and 
character shouM matter, either to us or to anyone else, at all. 
I I I .  A K A N T I A N  C O N C E P T I O N  O F  T H E  S E L F  
Clearly, the problems of self-evaluation and moral paralysis can be generated 
by any multipartite conception of the self. Just as clearly, these problems are 
also generated by a unipartite conception of the self as structured and moti- 
vated by desires alone. The question then arises of whether the remaining in- 
house candidate, namely reason, might be adequate to structure and motivate 
a unipartite conception of the self that both successfully circumvents these 
problems and respects the psychological data. 
I shall argue that reason fulfills these desiderata, first by limning what I 
shall describe as a Kantian conception of the self. On this conception, roughly, 
the self is motivated and structured by the internalized norms that dispose it 
to various kinds of  conscious behavior; and overridingly by a highest-order 
norm of theoretical rationality that secures its internal unity. My debt to 
portions of  the Analytic and Dialectic of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason will 
become increasingly evident, 22 as will my frequent departures from Kant's 
actual doctrine. 23 Later, in Sections IV and V, I shall try to show the com- 
petitive superiority of  the Kantian conception, by arguing that it better 
explains certain psychological facts of our experience, and also provides 
solutions to the companion problems of self-evaluation and moral paralysis. 
Consider first the question of motivation. Kantians often confront the 
objection that without stipulating desire as a motivation for action, they are 
hard pressed to provide an explanation of why an agent would act in accord- 
ance with norms or principles. Elsewhere 24 I have argued that desire in any 
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case cannot be a necessary motivation for action if the concept of  desire is 
nontrivially construed; and that in fact many of  the actions we perform - 
such as answering the telephone by saying 'Hello?', crossing at the green, or 
helping the needy can be better explained without them: In most such 
cases, we reflexively do what comes most naturally, and this, in turn, depends 
on our upbringing, habits, and social conditioning, not on whatever desires we 
may or may not suppose ourselves to have. Agents often act in accordance 
with norms or principles and without the intervention o f  desire, then, if those 
norms have been sufficiently internalized in the normal process of  socializa- 
tion so as to dispose them reflexively to such action when actualizing condi- 
tions obtain. 
By a norm, I shall mean a recommendation, principle, rule, or law that 
prescribes behavior in the service of  some favored goal; call such behavior 
purposive. The goal in question may be the achievement of  some valued 
end-state, or it may be adherence to some valued standard of  behavior. 
Conscious intentional behavior is norm-governed if it is caused by a disposi- 
tion, normatively instilled in the process of  socialization, to respond purpo- 
sively to stimili under actualizing circumstances as the norm perscribes. By a 
disposition I mean a settled and regular tendency to behave in a certain way 
under certain recurrent kinds of  circumstances (rather than an entity's 
structural propensitY to react nomologicaUy to certain kinds of  causal- 
counterfactual conditions, even if those conditions should never obtain). A 
disposition is normatively instilled by such processes if there are social or 
physical factors in the environment that positively reinforce that response 
under its actualizing circumstances, and negatively reinforce its absence. Thus 
we can think of  the social processes by which normative dispositions are 
instilled as not unlike the process Aristotle describes as habituation: 25 We 
learn to mimic repeatedly, under similar circumstances, the like behavior of  
elders or peers with whom we identify, or whose approval we seek; and the 
more frequently we rehearse the behavior under appropriate circumstances 
and are socially reinforced for doing so, the more natural and reflexive it 
becomes. 
I shall refer to norms that govern the behavior of  the Kantian self as 
motivationally effective norms. This does not mean that we must consciously 
strive to conform to these norms in order to be motivated by them. Nor need 
these norms be actually stated in a prescriptive form in order to be motiva- 
tionally effective: We can easily imagine a community that adheres effortless- 
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ly and unselfconsciously to the norms that govern it, as Kant's fully rational 
beings do, 26 rather than agonizing over them as we often do. Rather, a 
motivationally effective norm is one that has been selectively instilled in the 
ways already suggested, such that we are ordinarily disposed to conform our 
behavior to it. 
One mark that distinguishes us from other norm-governed sentient species, 
on this conception, is the centrality of shared, motivationally effective cogni- 
tive and linguistic norms that enable us to conceptualize all our behavior and 
experience to ourselves. Hence we are not merely norm-governed. We are 
governed by norms that enable us to know that we are. Thus the norms 
definitive of  the Kantian self include, first and foremost, norms of cognitive 
behavior, i.e. prescriptive principles in accordance with which we are disposed 
to make sense of our experiences by generalizing over them and identifying 
particular experiences as instances of more general concepts: On this view, 
our thinking is ordinarily norm-governed. Secondly, these norms include 
norms of linguistic behavior, i.e. prescriptive principles in accordance with 
which we are disposed to apply to our particular experiences the general 
linguistic terms that symbolize the concepts we form. Thus our concepts and 
linguistic practices are similarly norm-governed according to this conception. 
Thirdly, the Kantian self is defined by norms of emotional andgross physical 
behavior, i.e. general prescriptive principles to which we are usually disposed 
to conform our emotions, actions, and habits as instances. 
However, on this view, we no more have direct access to emotions, actions, 
or habits, unmediated by the norm-governed concepts in terms of which we 
make sense of them, than we do external events in the world at large. 27 Both 
internal and external phenomena are subject to interpretation by cognitive and 
linguistic norms. Thus, for example, if motivationaUy effective linguistic 
norms prescribe the vocabulary of desire to conceptualize motivation, a 
person will be disposed to use that vocabulary in interpreting their own 
behavior. On the other hand, if the vocabulary of desire is not prevalent, and 
altruistic behavior, say, is a motivationally effective social norm, as among 
the Zufii of New Mexico, a person may be correctly described as moved by 
the perception of distress to render aid. By identifying the Kantian self 
primarily with its contextually determined cognitive and linguistic norms, 
rather than with the brute psychological phenomena interpreted as those 
norms prescribe, we leave open the question of what kinds of internal states 
should be invoked to explain the motivations of differently socialized selves, 
and how those states are to be conceptualized. ~8 
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In addition to the motivationally effective norms that govern the actual 
behavior of the Kantian self, there are also those norms with which the self 
actively identifies, and which constitute its normative self-conception. These 
may include, be identical with, or entirely disjoint from the motivationally 
effective ones. Thus a normative self-conception is related to the Kantian self 
as is a desired self-conception to the Humean self. Both evaluate our lower- 
order dispositions, beliefs, impulses, and goals as either conforming to or 
violating that self-conception, and both supply a prima facie motive for 
action. 29 
Now let us turn to the structure of the Kantian self. Like the Humean self, 
the Kantian self is also structured by rationality principles. However, each 
gives a different priority to the role of theoretical reason. On the Humean 
conception, reason and understanding have subordinate and instrumental 
roles. They enable us to organize and rank our desires, and to formulate 
maximally efficient plans for satisfying them. Hence they address only the 
strategic issues raised by what I shall describe as the gross phenomena of  
action: our consciously envisioned ends, our choices and plans, and the 
sequence of steps by which we carry them out. On the Kantian conception of 
the self, by contrast, the gross phenomena of action are only one kind of 
purposive behavior among many others, all of which are governed by motiva- 
tionally effective norms, but not all of which are oriented towards the maxi- 
mization of utility (witness the prohibition against eating one's peas with a 
knife). And so the principles of instrumental reason constitute only one kind 
of motivationally effective norm among many others. 
On the Kantian conception, all such norms are themselves subordinate to 
those cognitive norms of generalization and concept-formation just men- 
tioned. For on this view, the disposition to render all our experiences, including 
our experiences of our own conscious behavior, rationally intelligible is 
overriding. An experience is rationally intelligible if it can be identified by the 
agent as an instance of more general, motivationally effective norm-governed 
concepts. Consider the following example. I can make the most recent sound 
event I've experienced involving drums, bass, sax, and lead guitar rationally 
intelligible by identifying it as an instance of the norm-governed concept, 
'Fusion', in part because this concept instantiates the more general norm- 
governed concept, 'Jazz', and 'Rhythm and Blues', which in turn instantiate 
the norm-governed concept, 'Music ~, all of which are motivationally effective 
for me. The concept, 'Fusion' is norm-governed in that its use i s prescribed by 
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socially operative norms of  language and musicology such as the following: 
'Apply the concept,  "Fusion" to sound events utilizing drums, bass, sax, lead 
guitar, blues, scales, polyrhythms, melodic improvisation, and a 4/4 meter ' .  
The concept,  'Fusion'  is motivationally effective for me if I am disposed to 
use that concept correctly, and respond to instances of  it appropriately (i.e. 
with a range of  positive or negative judgments and responses that recognize it 
as an instance of  a certain kind of  music, embedded in a certain cultural, 
political, and aesthetic context,  and so on). I f  an initially unfamiliar event or 
experience could not be made rationally intelligible in this way, relative to 
our background assumptions, it is not clear how it could be integrated into 
the unified continuum of  our experiences at all. Seemingly, it would stand 
apart as an unintelligible phenomenon to which the concepts we normally 
invoke to make sense of things bore no relation. But if it were in theory 
impossible for us to integrate it conceptually with our other experiences, it 
would seem equally impossible for it to constitute part of  a unified self. I 
leave further elaboration of  this point to Kant. 3~ Similarly, if I behave in a 
way that cannot be identified as an instance of  those more general norms of  
socially acceptable behavior which are motivationally effective for me, I may 
have trouble making sense of  what I did, and why. 
The structural relations among norms that  are motivationally effective in 
the Kantian self are determined, then, by the disposition to organize experi- 
ence in accordance with the norms of  theoretical reason, i.e. by our disposi- 
t ion to individuate, compare, differentiate, and generalize consistently over 
different classes of  experience to increasing degrees of  inclusiveness. Hence, 
the Kantian self consists not of  first- and second-order phenomena,  but 
rather in a potentially infinite plethora of  lower- and higher-order norms of  
increasing generality and comprehensiveness. The more comprehensive are 
our conceptualizations of  our experience, the more internally integrated the 
self becomes. Thus preservation of  the unity of  the self and preservation of  its 
rational intelligibility are equivalent. 31 I shall express this idea by ascribing to 
the Kantian self a highest-order disposition to rationality. For reason, on this 
view, supplies the primary and constitutive conditions of  the internal coher- 
ence of  the self, not just the instrumental conditional o f  its satisfaction. 
Now in fact we experience the failure to achieve thoroughgoing rational 
intelligibility all the time. There are many events in the world of  which we 
have trouble making sense, and often our own behavior is equally mysterious 
to us. So to ascribe to the Kantian conception of  the self a highest-order 
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disposition to rationality is not to claim that we regularly succeed in rendering 
our experiences rationally intelligible. Further evidence for the view that we 
have such a disposition must be culled from indirect sources, and in the next 
section I shall try to provide some. 
Earlier I claimed that the Humean conception of the self was future- 
oriented, heteronymous, and individualistic. By contrast, the Kantian self is 
present-oriented, autonomous, and social. It is presen t -o r i en t ed  in that the 
self finds expression through actions that conform to the normative principles 
which presently govern it, not through realizing the envisioned state of affairs 
at which it aims. So, for example, if the norm 'Render aid to the needy' is 
motivationally effective for me, then I express myself by rendering aid to the 
needy, not by formulating and satisfying in the future my present desire to 
render aid to the needy. It has already been suggested that there are myriad 
actions we perform which are intentional, but actualize only present norma- 
tive dispositions, not future objects of desire. 
Second, the Kantian self is a u t o n o m o u s  rather than heteronymous. For 
the conditions of  its expression - i.e., the internalized social norms with 
which it is identified - are objects or states of affairs which are internal to 
the very constitution of the self. Actions determined by such normative dis- 
positions express the self in virtue of their motivational source, not their 
actual or expected consequences. We do not normally await the outcome of 
our actions in order to decide whether we have successfully given vent to our 
impulses. Rather, we act (or, more often, react) in characteristic ways, 
determined by personality and circumstance, and hope for the best. The self 
is expressed in action, not in that for the sake of which it acts. 
Finally, the Kantian conception of the self is social rather than individ- 
ualistic. For if the self is to be identified with motivationally effective norms, 
then i t  is in fact defined by the particular social imperatives, recognized or 
unrecognized, to which it actively responds. It is not ultimately defined by a 
context-independent drive to achieve private satisfactions. This is merely the 
way our  social norms make it look to us.  
IV.  R A T I O N A L I T Y  A N D  S E L F - P R E S E R V A T I O N  
Next I should like to amplify and defend the claim that actual selves have a 
highest-order disposition to rationality, and so that the Kantian conception of 
the self is the correct one. I shall suggest one primary criterion of rational 
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intelligibility that any rational norm which is motivationally effective for us 
must satisfy, and three compensatory self-protective mechanisms we typically 
deploy - in vain - in order to preserve the rational coherence of the self 
against the threat of disunity, a2 There are other interesting constraints on 
rationality that can be derived from this primary one, but I shall not discuss 
them in this context, a3 Instead, I shall describe how our highest-order dis- 
position to rationality enables us to solve the problem of moral paralysis in 
practice. 
The primary requirement on rational norms is that they be internally 
coherent. This requires that the various components of our norm-governed 
experience be integrated and unified under the rubric of more general and 
comprehensive norms in the manner already described. This in turn requires 
not only that such norms satisfy the law of noncontradiction, i.e. that they 
be consistent. It also requires that they share features in common that allow 
us to apply to them more general norms which are motivationally effective 
for us, i.e. that we be able to generalize meaningfully over them. 
For example, take the relatively general and motivationally effective 
cognitive norm that directs us to understand an external event in the world 
by seeking out its causal relations. Acting on this norm is logically consistent 
with that of trying to understand internal mental events, such as beliefs and 
feelings, by seeking out their causal origins in our upbringing, social environ- 
ment, and previous experiences. But it is also similar in its reliance on causal 
explanation. The more general norm under which both are subsumed directs 
us to understand all the phenomena of experience by seeking out their causal 
connections. 
However, we experience difficulty in applying this norm to all cases, and 
then we must resort to pseudorational mechanisms. For instance, the micro- 
phenomena studied by quantum physics seem peculiarly resistant to causal 
explanation, and our instinctive response to this fact is illuminating. We 
begin by denying the phenomenon, and cast about for flaws in the experi- 
mental design or apparatus to account for the apparent illusion. The intracta- 
bility of the phenomenon to our attempts to wish it away are then met by a 
rationalization: We argue that there must be a causal explanation of this 
phenomenon, but that we are insufficiently equipped to discover its causes. 
When the evidence indicates the untenability of this position, we shrug our 
shoulders and proceed to dissociate the phenomena of quantum physics from 
the comprehensible world of causal relations we aspire to grasp. And we 
188 A D R I A N  M. S. P I P E R  
thereby suffer the perplexity of trying, and failing, to see how the principles 
of quantum physics might be made to fit with everything else we think we 
know. 34 
Thus we defend the rational coherence of our experience by rationalizing, 
dissociating, or denying any phenomenon that threatens it. In rationalization, 
we apply a concept too broadly, ignoring or minimizing properties of that 
phenomenon that resist this generalization, and magnifying properties that 
support it. In dissociation, we resist or reject applicable generalization, 
instead relegating the phenomenon in question to the status of  an alien and 
inscrutable enigma. In denial, we simply ignore or deny the existence of the 
phenomenon altogether, in order to maintain the appearance of conceptual 
coherence - or, as I shall say, the pseudocoherence - of our experiences. 
What makes these mechanisms pseudorational is that they each truncate or 
distort our experience in order to preserve its rational intelligibility. We can 
think of these three defense mechanisms, then, as ways in which our theoreti- 
cal reason rallies, valiantly but ineffectively, to the challenge posed by con- 
ceptually unmanageble realities. 
Consider next a comparable example of norm-governed emotional behav- 
ior. We are socially and biologically disposed to delight in the esteem or admira- 
tion of a person we love. We are similarly disposed to feel self-confidence and 
optimism upon receiving praise from some superior whose authority we 
respect. The more general, motivationally effective norm of which both of 
these are instances prescribes a positive joyful response to obtaining approval 
from someone whose regard is valuable to us. 
However, we do not always respond emotionally in the way we recognize 
as appropriate. Suppose a highly valued personage in one's life - a respected 
colleague, say - shares too many extrinsic traits in common with other 
individuals one has valued highly in the past who have responded negatively 
to one's quest for approval. Suppose, for example, that she resembles one's 
mother, hated sibling, or former spouse. Then one may respond to her esteem 
or praise, sought-after and highly valued as it clearly is, not with delight or 
self-confidence, but instead with rage, resentment, or the suspicion of ridicule. 
One's awareness that such emotions are inappropriate may then lead one to 
deny or suppress the feelings in question, or to refuse to identify them for 
what they really are. Thus one may express one's resentment in the form of 
sarcasm or verbal abuse, and claim, upon being confronted, that one was 
only joking, meant no harm, that one's victim is oversensitive or insecure, and 
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so on. Alternately, one may rationalize one's anger by calling attention to the 
person's irritating imperfections, and claiming, for example, that anyone who 
speaks in a high whine, has dandruff, and wears galoshes all the time is bound 
to provoke blind fury, no matter what her virtues. Finally, one may simply 
dissociate or disown one's inappropriate emotional response by claiming that 
it overtook one as a blind, irresistable impulse, and was completely outside 
one's ability to control. People who take this last tack tend not to recognize 
the inconsistency involved in then promising that it will never happen again. 
Similar considerations apply, finally, to the gross phenomena of action. 
Suppose, for example, that I conceive myself as a fair, tolerant, and sympa- 
thetic individual, and that most of my actions square with this normative 
self-conception: I am in fact loyal to my friends, actively concerned to 
promote others' wellbeing, and so on. However, I also spread unfounded and 
damaging gossip about individuals I dislike, thereby causing them severe 
personal and professional distress. This behavior would seem to be a patent 
instance of motivationally effective norms that are inconsistent with those 
governing the rest of  my conduct, and so violate my normative self-concep- 
tion. My disposition to preserve the internal coherence of my self-conception 
may then lead me to employ one of the defensive strategies just enumerated. 
First I may begin by denying, perhaps sincerely, that I behaved in this way at 
all; or recall the behavior but deny that it is an instance of spreading un- 
founded and damaging gossip. Rather, I may argue, it is merely an instance of 
indulging confidentially in harmless speculation. I thereby deny as well the 
very real damaging consequences of my behavior, and ultimately my own 
responsibility for bringing them about. Second, I may rationalize my conduct 
by arguing, say, that everyone gossips without thereby victimizing their 
subjects; and that after all, no one need worry who has nothing to hide. Thus 
the implicit thesis is that anyone who is damaged by unfounded gossip must 
have deserved it. Finally, I may disown or dissociate my behavior from that 
constellation of motivationally effective norms I identify as myself. By 
pleading that I am neurotic and easily threatened by others, and that mobi- 
lizing a network of social condemnation against them is a self-defensive reflex 
over which I have no control, I locate the cause of my behavior outside the 
scope of my voluntary agency. 3s 
These self-defensive mechanisms for resolving internal incoherences are 
just as inadequate to integrate anomalies in our normative self-conception as 
they were to integrate anomalies in our normative emotional behaviour, and 
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m our normative conception of the physical world. They put a strain on the 
self that forces it to engage in yet more elaborate and irrational attempts to 
preserve its pseudocoherence, as, for example, when I conclude from the 
phenomenon of quantum mechanics that all events must be random and all 
regularities illusory; or when I attempt to cultivate an attitude of emotional 
indifference towards anyone whose approval I in fact value highly; or when I 
ascribe to the person I have maligned through gossip a malevolent power to 
make me feel guilty. These responses to the internal incoherence of the self 
are irrational because they themselves ramify that incoherence yet more 
widely throughout the structure of the self, and demand yet more elaborate 
attempts to ameliorate it; attempts which are similarly doomed to failure. 
The threat of ego disunity thus generates a stance of vigilant, self-protective 
defensiveness. For the more incoherent and irrational the behavior of the self, 
the more vulnerable to such threats it becomes. 
For an imperfect but unimpeded Kantian self, acknowledging one's 
delinquent behavior as irrational is the best strategy for preserving the self 
against radical disunity, for this is to recognize that behavior as the painful 
threat it is to the rational coherence of the self. But since the Kantian self 
has, by hypothesis, a highest-order disposition to preserve the theoretically 
rational unity of  its experience, the recognition that this unity is being 
destroyed by its own behavior disposes it, over the long term, to modify that 
behavior accordingly. In actual fact, it is questionable whether we ever truly 
succeed in reforming our conduct, without the prodding of these painful 
insights into our own irrationality. 
However, even this is an option that not all selves are free to exploit. For 
though I have argued that all selves are in fact disposed to attain and preserve 
the internal coherence of their experience by the motivationally effective 
cognitive norm of rational intelligibility, it does not follow from this that all 
serves are governed by the linguistic norm prescribing correct use of the 
concept of rational intelligibility. Hence not all selves may be disposed to 
think of themselves as having a highest-order commitment to rational intelligi- 
bility per se, not to apply that concept correctly to their own behavior. And 
so the existence of demonstrably irrational behavior may not suffice to insure 
its rational modification. Perhaps one may believe, rather, that being a 
sensitive or virtuous individual, or being interesting, or politically committed, 
is more important than anything else. Then one will be impelled, under 
attack, to defend one's behavior at all costs in these terms, even in the face of 
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glaring inconsistencies, and regardless of the psychological discomfort it 
causes one to do so. Here one will be disposed to rationalize, dissociate, or 
deny any evidence that undetermines this defense. And of course this response 
itself will strongly indicate that those values did not, in fact, have primacy in 
one's hierarchy after all. For in this case, the defense of one's own behavior 
requires the suppression or distortion of one's values in the service of  pseudo- 
rationality, and so sacrifices them for the appearence that one's behavior is 
rationally justified. And it is precisely the appearance of rationality 
that the self is, on this view, most centrally disposed to preserve. Any such 
values which are not finally consistent with the principles of theoretical 
rationality will be sacrificed similarly, in order to preserve the internal pseu- 
docoherence of the self. 
Thus do we resolve the problem of moral paralysis in practice. In fact, we 
are seldom torn by conflicting dispositions of  the self, or inhibited from 
acting by uncertainty about our moral rectitude. More frequently, we simul- 
taneously resolve the conflict and ensure our moral rectitude by appealing to 
some conceptualization of our actions that succeeds in preserving their 
coherence (or pseudocoherence) with the rest of our behavior, and thereby 
permits us to keep peace with our consciences. It is only to the extent that 
we fail recognizably to preserve coherence that we are led, by our instinct for 
self-preservation, to change our ways. 
V. WHY I S H O U L D  N O T S P E N D  MY E V E N I N G S  H O W L I N G  AT THE 
M O O N  
The Kantian conception of the self outlined in this discussion treats the self 
as a natural phenomenon, comparable, in many respects, to other natural 
phenomena we encounter. Like the latter, it is causally determined and 
shaped by forces - biological, social, environmental - over which no one 
individual has any significant degree of control. As we do to other natural 
phenomena, we respond to the phenomenon of the self by trying to make it 
rationally intelligible to ourselves in socially conditioned, norm-governed 
terms. Like the failure of  other natural phenomena, the failure of the self to 
conform to the norms by which we explain it provokes in us compensatory 
defense mechanisms, aimed at preserving the illusion of its rational intelligi- 
bility against the reality of its deviation. The failure of these mechanisms 
leads us to revise our thinking about the self, just as it does our thinking about 
the behavior of other natural phenomena, and to formulate alternative norm- 
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governed concepts to which the actual behavior of  the self more closely 
corresponds. 
But here the similarity with other natural phenomena ends. For unlike 
them, an essential feature - in my opinion, the most essential feature of  the 
self is its very disposition to render its experience rationally intelligible. By 
contrast to our characterizations of  the behavior of  other phenomena that is 
conceptually anomalous, we are not let off  the cognitive hook by dismissing 
our own behavior merely as, say, random rather than causal, or biologically 
deviant rather than stereotypical, or statistically improbable rather than 
likely. Instead, the failure of  our defense mechanisms to sustain the appear- 
ance of  rationality disposes us, in the case of  the self, to recognize our behav- 
ior, specifically, as irrational, i.e., as incoherent and therefore a harbinger of  
ego-disintegration; and so to reform our behavior accordingly. Thus the self is 
unlike other natural phenomena in that its internal resources for altering its 
own behavioral patterns is identical to its tendency to understand them. 
And this tendency itself, which I have described as a disposition to rational 
coherence, in turn is identical to our disposition to literal self-preservation. 
This is what I mean by calling it a highest-order motivationally effective norm 
of  human behavior. 
Now this highest-order norm of  theoretical rationality imposes an upper 
limit upon the proliferation o f  lower-order norms constitutive of  the Kantian 
self, and so solves the problem of  self-evaluation with which we began. For the 
ascent to n + / -order  norms from which to evaluate the n-order dispositions 
and behavior of  the self are finally subject to the requirement that all such 
n +/ -order  norms succeed in rendering those dispositions and behavior 
rationally intelligible in the sense explained. But to demonstrate their rational 
intelligibility is to provide an authoritative justification for maintaining them. 
For it answers the question of  why we should behave in a certain way by 
demonstrating that it is in accord with the normative demands of  theoretical 
rationality to do so. To then ask for reasons why we should do what it is 
demonstrably rational to do presupposes that in fact we should. 
Thus there is in fact good reason why I should not spend my evenings 
howling at the moon,  hence good reason why I should not desire intrinsically, 
at the highest order, to do so. This is that I have a certain norm-governed, 
coherent self-conception that includes a concept of  what it means to be and 
to behave like a human being, with which howling at the moon is inconsistent. 
This concept is motivationaUy effective for me in that it disposes me to pick 
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out, correctly identify, and evaluate instances of  characteristically human 
behavior as such, to form justified expectations about my own and other 
people's behavior in light of  it, and unreflectively to conform my own behav- 
ior to it. 36 Of course, like most human beings, I have the capacity to violate 
this concept in my own behavior; but if I am sufficiently well socialized, I 
lack the disposition to do so. To then spend my evenings howling at the 
moon despite this would be to violate my own rationally intelligible self- 
conception, i.e. my conception of  the kind of  creature 1 am. It would force 
me to deny, rationalize or dissociate myself from my own behavior, in order 
to preserve my sense of  self as a human being. 
But these self-defensive strategies would probably fail. I could not for long 
deny or ignore the fact that 1 regularly spent my evenings howling at the 
moon,  without provoking all the attendant difficulites that anmesia tends to 
bring. And to what rationalization could I appeal to restore intelligibility to 
my  conception of  what I was doing: that everyone has their little idiosyncra- 
cies, perhaps? This appeal would certainly fail, since as a matter of  empirical 
fact, the range of  behavior we are willing to recognize under the aegis o f  
'human idiosyncrasy' simply does not extend this far. Of course our concep- 
tion of  human nature responds flexibly to the variety of  circumstances and 
ways in which human nature develops. Nevertheless, it is sufficiently circum- 
scribed so that we are disposed to recognize a genuine anomaly when we 
encounter it. That is, we are disposed to differentiate such behavior from 
our norm-governed concept of  how human beings are characteristically 
disposed to behave. And so I, as the anomalous agent, would be self-defen- 
sively moved to dissociate my own identity as a human being from the actual 
behavior I performed. And then I could retain my sense of  humanity only by 
disavowing my own agency; or retain my  agency by disaffiliating my connec- 
tion with humanity. That I would in either case effect such a radical incoher- 
ence within the self is why it would be irrational for me to spend my evenings 
howling at the moon. 
However, the perspective of  rational intelligibility from which we are 
disposed to survey, evaluate, and organize the lower-order normative com- 
ponents of  the self may not be the perspective of  our explicit normative self- 
conception. For if we are without illusions about the degree of  rationality we 
are in fact able to attain, we may disavow any conscious commitment to 
rationality whatsoever. This may lead us, in turn, to reject the rational 
perspective as impersonal, and detached from everything that gives our lives 
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meaning .  But  I am incl ined to dismiss this stance, t oo ,  as a bit  o f  self-decept ion 
that  is u l t imate ly  incoherent .  Fo r  w i thou t  a c o m m i t m e n t  to ra t ional i ty ,  
however  invo lun ta ry  it may  be, our  lives could  l i terally have no meaning in 
any sense o f  the  word ;  and in pract ice we are forced to recognize this. A 
failure o f  ra t ional  intel l igibil i ty is a failure o f  comprehens ion ;  a lacuna in our  
accounts  o f  ourselves, o the r  people ,  and the wor ld  at large. A failure o f  
comprehens ion  in tu rn  signals our  irradicable a l ienat ion f rom the  objec t  
under  scrut iny,  i.e., the  admission o f  the opaque,  the  incoheren t ,  the  inex- 
plicable,  in to  our  concep t ion  o f  reali ty;  and this confl icts  w i th  our  mos t  
basic inst inct  o f  self-preservation. Fo r  typical ly  cons t i tu ted  human  beings, the 
dis integrat ion o f  the  self is psychological ly  equivalent  to  the  death  o f  the  
self, and this is a state we are disposed to avoid at all costs. The Kant ian  
concep t ion  o f  the  self acknowledges  this impor tan t  fact  about  us. On this 
concep t ion ,  then ,  a rat ional  self is a ful ly unif ied and integrated self; a self to  
which,  I have tr ied to show, human  beings are characteris t ical ly disposed to 
aspire. 
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NOTES 
This conception is probably not embraced in its entirety by any one of its adherents. 
Rather, different facets of it are called into service to do different philosophical jobs: to 
explain behavior, for example; or to analyze moral motivation, or freedom of the will. 
Thus the picture I shall sketch is a composite one, drawn from many different sources. 
2 Richard Brandt and Jaegwon Kim, 'Wants as explanations of action', in N. S. Care and 
C. Landesman (eds.), Readings in the Theory of Action (Indiana University Press,  
Bloomington, IN, 1969), pp. 199-213. 
Brandt and Kim explicitly mean to construe wants (or desires) as theoretical con- 
structs, with no experiential analogues (pp. 200-202 and fn. 2). This interpretation 
allows them to apply the concept of a want or desire to the explanation of a broader 
range of behavior than would be suggested by the ordinary sense. However, five of their 
six proposed criteria for the correct usage of ~x wants p' make explicit references to x's 
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experience of such feehngs as joy or disappointment in the attainment or nonattainment 
of p, pleasure in entertaining the thought of p or in the occurrence of p, and an impulse 
to do the act that x believes will eventuate in p. To analyze the concept of a want or 
desire for p in terms of joy or pleasure at the satisfaction of that want and a felt impulse 
to achieve that satisfaction seems inconsistent with denying that 'want' denotes an 
experience. If it denotes a constellation of experiences then presumably it denotes each 
conjointly in that constellation. My quarrel here is not with Brandt's and Kim's analysis, 
but rather with their attempt to divest the concept of a want or a desire of the particular 
experience (or conjunction of experiences) that individuate it from other motivational 
states. 
3 Bernard Williams, 'Persons, character and morality', in A. O. Rorty, Ed., The Identi- 
ties of  Persons (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1976). 
4 This distinction is first made explicitly in Harry Frankfurt's seminal article 'Freedom 
of the will and the concept of a person', Journal of Philosophy LXVIII, No. 1 (January 
!971), pp. 5-20.  Frankfurt's main thesis is comparable to Wright Neely's apparently 
independent treatment in 'Freedom and desire', Philosophical Review LXXXIII, No. 1 
(January 1974), pp. 32-54.  
Although Neely emphasizes the contrast between the ordinary sense of 'desire' as one 
motive to action among many and the extended philosophical sense that includes all 
such motives to action, he makes it equally clear that the advantage of the philosophical 
sense is that it implies means for analyzing all the multifarious motives for the action in 
terms of 'desire' in something like the ordinary sense. Thus he seems to mean 'desire' in 
the technical sense to cover or substitute for duties, purposes, intentions, and volitions - 
as would similarly technical terms like 'conation' and 'appetition', each of which could 
be interpreted or analyzed in terms of 'desire' in a more ordinary sense, as Neely's 
examples of duty and wellbeing illustrate. If this interpretation can be carried through, 
such that each motive to action can be claimed to include a desire in the ordinary sense, 
then using 'desire' in the technical sense to denote all such motives has obvious advan- 
tages over terms like 'conation' and 'pro-attitude'. 
5 This conception of the Humean self as structured by the principles of instrumental 
rationality is explicated in greatest detail in Chapter VII, 'Goodness as rationality', of 
John Rawls'A Theory of  Justice (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1973). See 
especially Sections 63-64 and the bibliography cited there. 
6 Hume, A Treatise of  Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, (London, Oxford University 
Press, 1968), Book II, p. 415. 
The classic statements of the belief-desire model of action are to be found in Richard 
Brandt and Jaegwon Kim, 'Wants as explanations of action', (op. eit.) and Donald 
Davidson, 'Actions, reasons and causes', in Care and Landesman, pp. 179-198, from 
which Neely's use of 'pro-attitude' stems. 
For applications in moral philosophy, see, for example, Phillippa Foot, 'Reasons for 
action and desire', Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume XLV (1972), pp. 
180-210 and 'Morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives', Philosophical Review 
81 (1972), pp. 305-316. 
See Note 3. 
9 An example of this strategy is to be found in Richard Brandt's 'Traits of character: A 
conceptual analysis', American Philosophical Quarterly 7, No. 1 (January 1970), espe- 
cially 27-30. This analysis builds on the earlier paper by Brandt and Kim (see Note 2). 
10 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of  the Metaphysic of  Morals, trans. H. J. Paton (Harper 
Torchbooks, New York, 1964), Ac. 441-5.  
la "This relation, whether based on inclination or on rational ideas, can give rise only to 
hypothetical imperatives: 'I ought to do something because I will something else.'" 
Ibid., Ac. 441; italics in original. 
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12 Bernard Williams argues this point  in 'Egoism and altruism', in Problems of  the Self 
(Cambridge University Press, New York, 1975). 
13 Op. tit., Note 4. Also see Gary Watson, 'Free agency', Journal o f  Philosophy LXXII,  
No. 8 (April 1975), pp. 205 -220 .  
14 Frankfurt ,  p. 16, (op. cit., Note 4). 
~3 In 'Responsibility for self', in Rorty.  
1~ Op. cit . ,Note 13. 
17 Ibid., p. 215. 
18 Ibid., p. 213. 
19 Wright Neely makes this point  in anticipation of  Watson's analysis (op. tit. Note 4), 
p. 42. Watson does not  use the term "s tandpoint"  as I do the term "self-conception".  
He means " the  point  of  view from which one judges the world".  (p. 216) He doubts the 
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